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ARTICLE
PRECEDENT, FAIRNESS, AND COMMON SENSE DICTATE
THAT PADILLA V. KENTUCKY SHOULD APPLY
RETROACTIVELY
William N. Conlow*
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided the landmark
case of Padilla v. Kentucky. The Padilla Court's holding
was that failure of counsel to advise a non-citizen criminal
defendant about the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. This
article addresses whether Padilla applies to convictions
that occurred before Padilla was decided, in March 2010.
First, this article provides background on relevant
immigration law, Padilla v. Kentucky, and the Supreme
Court's retroactivity case law. Then, this article considers
how lower courts have addressed the issue of retroactivity
in the approximately twenty-seven months after the Padilla
decision. This article also provides in-depth analysis of
circuit courts and state supreme courts which have
addressed the retroactivity issue. This article then critically
analyzes the common arguments for and against applying
Padilla retroactively. Finally, this article proposes that
Padilla apply to all non-citizens who have been deported as
a result of ineffective assistance of counsel.
On April 30, 2012, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide the issue this article discusses.
* Rutgers University School of Law-Camden, J.D. expected 2013.
Copyright @ 2012 William N. Conlow. Special thanks to Justin T.
Loughry, Esq. and Prof. Michael A. Carrier. I want to thank the former
for being the model of what a good lawyer should be, and for inspiring
this article, and the latter for being an extraordinary teacher. I am
dedicating this article to my soon-to-be alma mater, Rutgers University
School of Law-Camden. May it survive the sometimes-ugly
machinations of New Jersey politics.
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Although "confused and confusing," the Supreme Court's
retroactivity case law supports a finding that Padilla
applies retroactively. Similarly, fairness dictates that non-
citizens who have received ineffective assistance of counsel,
and been deported as a result, should be afforded a
remedy. Common sense also dictates that Padilla applies
retroactively. A plain reading of the Padilla case clearly
imagines the retroactive effect of the Padilla holding.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's application of the Padilla
rule to Jose Padilla was, in every sense, similar to those
who would benefit from Padilla being retroactive. For these
reasons, precedent, fairness and common sense dictate that
Padilla should apply retroactively.
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I. Introduction
In 2010, the Supreme Court handed down the
landmark decision of Padilla v. Kentucky.' Padilla held
that criminal defense attorneys have an affirmative
obligation to advise their clients about immigration
consequences of a plea bargain. The promise of Padilla is
great: to provide a remedy for the injustice that occurs
when an attorney falsely tells a non-citizen that he will not
be deported as a result of a guilty plea. For the many non-
citizens that have been deported after receiving ineffective
assistance of counsel, successfully challenging a plea
bargain may mean that they can return to their families in
2the United States. However, courts have found ways of
circumventing Padilla. For example, "one unanswered
question left in Padilla's wake[,] that could have the effect
of seriously circumscribing the protection that Padilla
provides," 3 is whether Padilla applies retroactively or not.
This article addresses whether Padilla applies
retroactively-in other words, to cases that are brought
based on convictions that occurred before Padilla was
decided, in March 2010.4 On April 30, 2012, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide this issue.' If Padilla
' 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
2 Determining the number of people who could potentially bring
Padilla claims is extremely difficult. But, data suggests that Padilla
will reach a large number of non-citizens. For example, "More than
128,000 noncitizens with criminal convictions were deported in 2009
[alone, and a]pproximately 95,000 noncitizens were incarcerated in
state and federal prisons and jails as of June 30, 2009." Gary Proctor
and Nancy King, Post Padilla: Padilla's Puzzles for Review in State and
Federal Courts, Fed. Sentencing Rep., Vol. 23, No. 3, 239, 239 (Vera
Inst. of Justice, Feb. 2011) (citation omitted).
Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy
Warnings on Defendants' Ability to Bring Successful Padilla Claims,
121 YALE L.J. 944, 947 (2012).
4Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1473.
5 Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
4
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does not apply retroactively, then the constitutional holding
of Padilla v. Kentucky applies to the pre-2010 conviction of
only one individual-Jose Padilla.6 This article argues that
precedent, fairness and common sense dictate that Padilla
should apply "retroactively" to all non-citizens that can
show ineffective assistance of counsel.
This article will proceed in six sections. Following
this introductory section, the second and third sections will
briefly discuss relevant immigration law and "retroactivity"
case law, respectively. The fourth section discusses how
courts have decided the issue of Padilla's retroactivity and
analyzes the bases of those decisions. The fifth section of
this article argues that courts have, generally, ignored the
fact that governing case law, fundamental fairness and
common sense dictate that Padilla should apply
retroactively to all cases on collateral review. Finally, the
sixth and last section concludes by summarizing why
Padilla should apply retroactively.
II. Background - Immigration Law
Criminal law and immigration law, once separate
entities, now overlap in many areas. One scholar has called
the overlapping areas of criminal law and immigration law
the "crimmigration system. The history of the American
"crimmigration system" has been defined by an
"increasingly harsh treatment of criminals [which] is
6 Arguably, the Supreme Court has applied the rule of Padilla a second
time. See infra p. 25.
7 Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-conviction Relief and the
Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 667 (2008); see
also Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v.
Kentucky: the Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-half
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1467 (2011) (calling the Padilla
decision a "recognition of the convergence between the deportation and
criminal systems").
5
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mirrored in the increasingly harsh treatment of non-citizens
in the United States."8
The starting point for how immigration law
informed the result in Padilla-and the effect that it has on
our retroactivity analysis-is the Padilla decision itself.
The Court found that over the last century there has been a
"steady expansion of deportable offenses."9 The Court also
noted that, in 1990, Congress eliminated the "judicial
recommendation against deportation" ("JRAD")
procedure, 0  which had previously given judges the
discretion to determine whether deportation was warranted
"on a case-by-case basis."''
The Justices who decided Padilla seem to be in
agreement that immigration law is "complex,"' 2 and that
there are "numerous situations in which the deportation
consequences of a plea are unclear." 3 Whether an offense
is deportable is often dictated by abstruse subcategories of
federal law. Further complications exist because it is often
difficult to determine whether a state law offense qualifies
under one of these subcategories.14 Therefore, when a non-
8 Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-conviction Relief and the
Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 667 (2008). Of
particular important in this article is the fact that, "[I]n the 1980s and
1990s, [Congress] dramatically expanded the scope of criminal
deportation grounds and, consequently, greatly expanded the number of
non-citizens deported for criminal offenses." Id. at 670.
9 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
10 Id.
" Id. at 1479.
12 Id. at 1483.
13 Id. at 1477; see also, id. at 1490 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that
making "the determination whether immigration law . . . makes a
particular offense removable" is often difficult).
14 "Legal counsel, [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] attorneys,
and immigration judges must determine whether the criminal
conviction, often a state crime, qualifies as a deportable offense . . .
[and t]his analysis often requires the mastery of both criminal and
immigration law." Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?:
6
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citizen is convicted of a state-level offense it "raise[s] the
challenge of determining [if that] state criminal conviction
fits under a federal category that" requires deportation.15
Adding to the uneven application of the law, the
Constitution does not generally apply to non-citizens;' 6
however, recent Supreme Court decisions, such as Padilla,
have challenged this principle.
In the mid-nineties, Congress greatly expanded the
number of crimes that resulted in deportation. The result
of these changes is that "non-violent offenders with minor
criminal histories are often deported."' 8 Further, federal
Recent Judicial Actions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L.
REV. CIRCUIT 1, 3 (2011).
15 Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-conviction Relief and
the Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 672 (2008).
16 Daniel Kanstroom, Padilla v. Kentucky and the Evolving Right to
Deportation Counsel: Watershed or Work-in-Progress?, 45 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 305, 311 (2011) ("If you think defending the rights of criminal
defendants is difficult (and it surely is), try working without a
constitution for a while-that is what a lot of immigration law is[.]").
7 Put differently, Congress made lesser and non-violent crimes much
more likely to result in deportation. "Harsh 1996 laws known by their
acronyms-AEDPA and IIRIRA-reflected a rather broad-brush crime
control justification for deportation and radically changed and
expanded the system." Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation
Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: the Challenging Construction of the
Fifth-and-a-half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 1477 (2011).
"[T]he Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
[("AEDPA")]... expanded the aggravated felony category[, a provision
that requires mandatory deportation,] to include crimes such as
gambling and bribery." Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the
Punishment?: Recent Judicial Actions Expanding the Rights of
Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 1, 6 (2011). "[With the] 1996 law,
the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
[("IIRIRA")], Congress further broadened the definition of aggravated
felony to include drug offenses, thefts, burglaries, and crimes of
violence." Id.
' Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent Judicial
Actions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT
1, 20 (2011).
7
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policymakers and law enforcement officials have
increasingly viewed the issue of immigration in the context
of national security. 19 The "U.S. Department of Homeland
Security [now] controls most of the [immigration] system
through its subagencies[.]" 20 Also, "Counterintuitively,
immigration judges are employees of the Attorney General,
not the judicial branch." 2 1 Further, immigration laws,
including those "that govern mandatory deportation," do
not weigh aggravating or mitigating factors, such as how
long a non-citizen has lived in the United States, or whether
the non-citizen has family ties in the United States. 2 2
Broadly, immigration policy places great weight on
familial relationships. 3 Therefore, when the adjudications
of criminal cases affect families, it is appropriate for courts
to consider the effect upon families. The Padilla Court
itself found that the "impact of deportation on families
living lawfully in this country" weighed in favor of the rule
that criminal defense attorneys must provide proper advice
19 For example, "During the 1996 debate on the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act . . . some members of Congress equated
noncitizens with terrorist aliens." Id. at 6. In addition, the enforcement
of immigration laws has become the prerogative of the Department of
Homeland Security, where its "personnel.. .investigate and detain non-
citizens charged with being deportable . . . and represent the
government in the deportation process before the immigration courts."
Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-conviction Relief and the
Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 671 (2008).
20 Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v.
Kentucky: the Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-half
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1465 (2011).
21 Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent Judicial
Actions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT
1, 14 (2011).
22 Id. at 2.
23 See Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating A "Best Interests of the Child"
Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEv. L.J. 120 (2009) (discussing the relationship between familial
relationships and immigration law).
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about the immigration consequences of a plea.24 The
immigration system, in its current form, "operates like a
blunt instrument, and in the process wreaks havoc on the
lives of noncitizens and their children, spouses, and
parents."25
It follows logically that if the effect of a criminal
sanction on families weighs in favor of the creation of the
rule announced in Padilla, then it also weighs in favor of
applying that rule retroactively. Families of criminal
defendants will be no less harmed by deportations of their
family members that resulted from plea agreements before
Padilla than they will by deportations of their family
members that occurred after Padilla. In fact, families are
more likely to be harmed by pre-Padilla pleas, to the extent
that non-citizens are more likely to have lived in the United
States for longer and established deeper roots.
III. Background - Padilla v. Kentucky, and
Governing Case Law
Padilla v. Kentucky was a landmark decision.26
24 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010); see also
McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to "Integral": The Seismic
Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond
Deportation, 54 HOw. L.J. 795, 823 (2011) (finding that "[a]ny
analysis of the severity of a penalty . . . properly encompasses the
impact both on clients and their families").
25 Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent Judicial
Actions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT
1, 20-21 (2011).
26 See Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea
Colloquy Warnings on Defendants' Ability to Bring Successful Padilla
Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 947 (2012) (calling Padilla a "landmark
decision[]"); see also McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to
"Integral": The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its
Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 How. L.J. 795, 798
(2011) (calling Padilla a "seismic event").
9
9.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 54
Padilla held that non-citizens who have been deported as a
result of a guilty plea where they received incorrect advice
about the deportation consequences of their plea can attack
their plea under the existing standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel27_i e. Strickland v. Washington.28
Those bringing "Padilla claims" 29 are not challenging their
deportation. In fact, even a successful Padilla claim may
still result in the original charges being re-filed.30 In
addition, to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, Strickland's "high bar" must be surmounted.
Prior to Padilla, a deported non-citizen had no
recourse if he relied on his lawyer's false counsel that he
would not be deported as a result of his plea bargain.
27 Padilla was a 7-2 decision. Justice Alito, in concurrence, did not join
the Court's opinion on the crucial issue of whether Padilla would
extend to conduct beyond affirmative misadvice. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at
1490 (Alito, J., concurring) ("I therefore cannot agree with the Court's
apparent view that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense
attorneys to provide immigration advice.").
28 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29 This article uses the term "Padilla claims" throughout as shorthand
for a person who brings an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
under Padilla. See, e.g., Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The
Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings on Defendants' Ability to Bring
Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944 (2012). Relatedly, this
article uses the term "petitioner" to refer to the individual bringing the
Padilla claim, unless doing so would be confusing or misleading.
30 It is important to note that all Padilla claims are challenging plea
bargains, which, by definition, contain a bargained-for benefit for the
petitioner. In other words, one possible criticism of Padilla is that it
opens the door for non-citizen defendants who would likely not have
benefited from going to trial to argue that they would have gone to trial
if they had been properly advised about the immigration consequences
of their plea. However, as the Court noted, "There is no reason to doubt
that lower courts-now quite experienced with applying Strickland-
can effectively and efficiently use its framework to separate specious
claims from those with substantial merit." Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
31 "Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Id. at
1485.
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Padilla came down in March, 2010.32 Some courts have
held that Padilla does not apply retroactively-that is, to
guilty 3pleas3 that occurred before that date.34 in Teague .
Lane, the Supreme Court explained when rules of
constitutional procedure apply retroactively: "new rules"
generally do not apply retroactively, to a case on collateral
review;36 'old rules," which merely announce what a rule
has always been, always apply retroactively to cases on
both direct and collateral review. 37
32 Id. at 1473.
33 Padilla only applies to criminal defendants who enter into a plea
bargain. If a criminal defendant goes to trial and loses, then he could
not have suffered prejudice under Strickland, because the result-
deportation-would have been the same whether or not he had received
effective assistance of counsel. See e.g. Maxwell v. United States,
CIV.A. JKB-l1-3190, 2011 WL 5870041, slip op. at 3 (D. Md. Nov.
21, 2011) (holding that "relief under a Sixth Amendment
analysis.. .does not apply to [Petitioner's] case... [because u]nlike the
defendant in Padilla, [the Petitioner] did not plead guilty; thus, his trial
counsel was not remiss in failing to tell him a guilty plea could result in
his deportation").
34 The Padilla Court did not state explicitly whether their holding
would apply retroactively. 130 S. Ct. at 1473.
3 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
36 Id. at 307 (plurality opinion) (holding that, for new rules, the
"general rule [is] nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review").
n Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) ("Under the Teague
framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but
a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct
review."). It is axiomatic that old rules apply "retroactively." If a case
does not announce a new rule, there is no need for the court to
"announce" what the old rule is or state that the case is an "old rule."
Therefore, when courts are analyzing whether a case applies
retroactively they usually say that the case is an application of an old
rule to a new set of facts, as opposed to referring to the case as simply
an "old rule." See Marroquin v. United States, CIV.A. M-10-156, 2011
WL 488985 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2011) (stating that "a majority of courts
have found that Padilla is simply the application of an old rule"); but
see Song v. United States, CV 09-5184 DOC, 2011 WL 2940316, slip
op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011) (concluding "that Padilla set forth on
[sic] 'old rule"').
11
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The "old rules" category includes when "a well-
established rule of law [is applied] in a new way based on
the specific facts of a particular case." 38 However, the fact
that a case was "not dictated by precedent," weighs in favor
of finding that a case announces a new rule. 39 Some courts
have mistakenly found that a case was 'not dictated by
precedent' if 'reasonable jurists' could have disagreed with
the result of the case that announced or applied the rule.4 0
The Supreme Court, however, stated that "the unlawfulness
of [the petitioner's] conviction [being] apparent to all
reasonable jurists" 41 weighs in favor of retroactivity, not
whether all reasonable jurists would agree with the result of
an appellate decision announcing the rule of constitutional
42criminal procedure.
Courts debating retroactivity have reached different
conclusions based on their interpretation of the above
language. Every court that has held that Padilla applies
retroactively, and stated how it reached that conclusion,
found that Padilla was not "new." 43 While courts'
38 United States v. Hubenig, 6:03-MJ 11-040, 2010 WL 2650625, slip
op. at 5 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) (citing Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222,
228-29 (1992)).
39 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion) (finding that "a case
announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final").
40 See infra pp. 26-27 (noting that courts have placed undue weight on
the split among the Justices in Padilla).
41 Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997) (emphasis
added).
42 This is a technical distinction; however, it is important to note that
regardless of whether Padilla is applied retroactively, those who have
valid Padilla claims nonetheless suffered a constitutional violation-
and, therefore, their conviction was unlawful. See cases cited infra note
47. The only issue, then, that 'reasonable jurists' can debate, is whether
their unlawful conviction can be remedied.
43 There are two instances when a "new rule" will apply retroactively:
1) when the rule "places certain kinds of primary private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe"; and 2) if the rule's existence is "implicit in the concept of
12
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decisions have turned on their interpretations of Supreme
Court precedent, critical language has gone largely
overlooked. For example, the Teague Court admonished
that:
We [will] simply refuse to announce a new
rule in a given case unless the rule would be
applied retroactively to the defendant in the
case and to all others similarly situated ...
We think this approach is a sound one. Not
only does it eliminate any problems of
rendering advisory opinions, it also avoids
the inequity resulting from the uneven
application of new rules to similarly situated
defendants. We therefore hold that, implicit
in the retroactivity approach we adopt today,
is the principle that habeas corpus cannot be
used as a vehicle to create new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure
unless those rules would be applied
retroactively to all defendants on collateral
review through one of the two exceptions
we have articulated.44
ordered liberty." Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (plurality opinion) (internal
citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, no
court has held that Padilla fits into either of these exceptions. See
Mudahinyuka v. United States, 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, slip op.
at 4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) ("This court is not aware of any decision by
a state or federal court holding that the Supreme Court recognized a
new right in Padilla that is also retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review.") In other words, the basis for applying Padilla
retroactively or not has always turned on the old rule/new rule
distinction.
44 Teague, 489 U.S. at 316 (plurality opinion).
13
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This language, and, more importantly, the
underlying declaration, has largely been ignored by courts
in deciding whether Padilla applies retroactively. 45
The Supreme Court itself has noted that the case
law governing retroactivity is "confused and confusing." 46
One possible source of the confusion is that retroactivity is
a "misnomer."4 7 In other words, as one court put it, "those
45 Research for this article uncovered only one reported decision which
attributes significance to the Supreme Court's self-proscription against
creating new rules that do not apply to all defendants on collateral
review. See Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL
3793691, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011) ("[W]hen a case is on
collateral review and the holding sought by the defendant would
announce a new rule that does not fit a Teague exception, the Supreme
Court will refuse to apply or announce the rule in that case. Padilla
was before the Supreme Court on collateral review and the Supreme
Court's holding (rule) was applied to Padilla. ") (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
46 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008).
4 Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, slip op. at 5
(referring to "retroactivity" as a "misnomer"); see also Danforth v.
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008)
(Not[ing] at the outset that the very word
'retroactivity' is misleading because it speaks in
temporal terms. 'Retroactivity' suggests that when
we declare that a new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure is 'nonretroactive,' we are implying that
the right at issue was not in existence prior to the date
the 'new rule' was announced. But this is incorrect.
As we have already explained, the source of a 'new
rule' is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power
to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the
underlying right necessarily pre-exists our
articulation of the new rule. What we are actually
determining when we assess the 'retroactivity' of a
new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly
announced right, but whether a violation of the right
that occurred prior to the announcement of the new
rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief
sought.)
14
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who suffered violations of constitutional rules of criminal
procedure that were articulated after their convictions
became final, nevertheless, suffered constitutional
violations. Therefore, the term 'retroactive' is a misnomer
because the question is really one of 'redressability."' 4 8
Perhaps because of the admittedly difficult nature of
applying retroactivity case law, courts have varied widely
in their retroactivity analysis. The result has been an
inconsistent approach-both in terms of what statements of
the Supreme Court lower courts have deemed are
controlling, and in the results those lower courts have
ultimately reached.
IV. Analyses of Courts' Decisions on Padilla's
retroactivity
A. Lower Courts
Whether Padilla's holding applies retroactively is a
"hot" topic in both federal and state courts. In the twenty-
seven months since Padilla was decided, more than fifty
courts have reached definitive conclusions regarding
whether Padilla applies retroactively.49 Four circuit courts
48 Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, slip op. at 5. While
the author of this article agrees with this court's analysis, the term
"retroactive" is still used throughout this article in conformity with the
language of the Supreme Court. See Christopher N. Lasch, The Future
of Teague Retroactivity, or "Redressability," After Danforth v.
Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New
Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction
Proceedings, 46 AM. CRtM. L. REv. 1, 35-36 (2009) (discussing the
Supreme Court's use of the terms 'retroactivity' and 'redressabiltiy').
49 This includes all reported decisions that have reached a substantive
conclusion regarding Padilla's retroactive application, including
opinions that were later abrogated by a different case. Opinions that
relegate discussion of retroactivity to a footnote, or otherwise mention
the issue only briefly, were not counted. Unpublished opinions, and
15
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have directly addressed the issue, with the Third Circuit5 o
answerinp the retroactivity question affirmatively, and the
Seventh, Tenth,52 and Fifth 53 Circuits reaching the
opposite conclusion. Arguably, other circuits have
addressed the issue-but only fleetingly, 54  or by
- 55implication.
Among federal district courts that have considered
the issue, courts in California, 56 Georgia,57  Illinois,58
Minnesota,59 MiSSissippi,60 Ohio,61 and Texas62 have found
opinions that apply binding precedent, are not discussed in this article
unless they are particularly illuminating on some relevant issue of law.
50 United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011).
51 Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
52 United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763 (10th
Cir., Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1, 2011).
5 United States v. Amer, 681 F.3d 211, 211 (2012).
54 United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, 404 Fed.Appx. 714, 716 n.1
(4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (stating that "nothing in the Padilla
decision indicates that it is retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review").
5 Arguably, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have applied Padilla
retroactively without explicitly stating so. In an unpublished opinion,
on remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit stated: "[w]e find
that Padilla has abrogated our holding in Santos-Sanchez. We therefore
vacate the district court's denial of Santos-Sanchez's petition for a writ
of coram nobis and remand to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with Padilla." Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 381 F.
App'x 419, slip op. at 1 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished).
Therefore, because the Fifth Circuit applied Padilla retroactively in
Santos-Sanchez, it could be argued that, in the Fifth Circuit, Padilla
applies retroactively by implication. Similarly, a California district
court argued that the Ninth Circuit applied Padilla retroactively in
another case. United States v. Krboyan, 1:02-CR-05438 OWW, 2011
WL 2117023, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) ("Based on the
Ninth Circuit's retroactive application of Padilla in [United States v.]
Bonilla, [637 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 2011)], Padilla applies
retroactively to Petitioner's writ of error coram nobis.").
56 Four district courts in California have found that Padilla applies
retroactively. See Jiminez v. Holder, 10-CV-1528-JAH NLS, 2011 WL
3667628, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011); Luna v. United States,
IOCV 1659 JLS POR, 2010 WL 4868062, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
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that Padilla applies retroactively to cases on collateral
63 64review. Similarly, state courts in Illinois, Maryland,
65 66 67 68Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York,
and Texas69 have reached the conclusion that Padilla
applies retroactively. Among the courts that reached the
opposite conclusion, that Padilla does not apply
23, 2010); United States v. Hubenig, 6:03-MJ-040, 2010 WL 2650625,
slip op. at 7 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010); United States v. Krboyan, 1:02-
CR-05438 OWW, slip op. at 9.
5 See United States v. Chong, CR 101-078, 2011 WL 6046905, slip op.
at 2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2011).
58 See United States v. Diaz-Palmerin, 08-CR-777-3, 2011 WL
1337326, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2011).
59 See United States v. Dass, CRIM. 05-140 (3) JRT, 2011 WL
2746181, slip op. at 5 (D. Minn. July 14, 2011)
6 See Amer v. United States, 1:06CRI 18-GHD, 2011 WL 2160553,
slip op. at 3 (N.D. Miss. May 31, 2011)
61 See United States v. Reid, 1:97-CR-94, 2011 WL 3417235, slip op. at
3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2011).
62 See Guadarrama-Melo v. United States, 1:08-CV-588, 2011 WL
2433619, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Tex. May 2, 2011); Marroquin v. United
States, CIV.A. M-10-156, 2011 WL 488985, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 4, 2011); McNeill v. United States, No. A-1 1-CA-495 SS A-I I-
CA-495 SS, 2012 WL 369471, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2012)
Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL 3793691, slip
op. at 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011); Zapata-Banda v. United States,
CIV. B:10-256, 2011 WL 1113586, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7,
2011).
63 See People v. Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ill. Ct. App. 2011).
6 See Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 928 (Md. 2011).
65 See Com. v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Mass. 2011).
66 See People v. Abbas, 794 N.W.2d 617, 617 (Mich. 2011).
67 See Campos v. State, 798 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
68 See People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696, slip op. at 4 (Crim. Ct.
2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, slip op. at 7 (Sup. Ct.
2010); People v. Nunez, 917 N.Y.S.2d 806, slip op. at 3 (App. Term
2010).
69 See Ex parte De Los Reyes, 350 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tex. App. 2011);
see also Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 01-10-00627-CR, 2011 WL 2132722,
slip op. at 7 (Tex. App. May 26, 2011).
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707retroactively, are federal courts in Alabama,70 California,n
72 73 7the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,74
75 76 7778Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
79 80 8 1Island, South Carolina, and Virginia, and state courts
70 See Emojevwe v. United States, 1:10CV229-MEF, 2011 WL
5118800, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2011).
71 See United States v. Cervantes-Martinez, 10CR4776 JM, 2011 WL
4434861, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011).
72 See Ufele v. United States, CRIM. 86-143 RCL, 2011 WL 5830608,
slip op. at 3. (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2011).
7 See United States v. Garcia, 2:88-CR-31-FTM-29DNF, 2011 WL
5024628, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2011); Llanes v. United
States, 8:11-CV-682-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 2473233, slip op. at 2 (M.D.
Fla. June 22, 2011); United States v. Macedo, 1:03-CR-00055-MP-AK,
2010 WL 5174342, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2010).
74 See United States v. Chapa, 800 F.Supp. 2d 1216, 1225 (N.D. Ga.
2011).
7 See Zoa v. United States, CIV. PJM 10-2823, 2011 WL 3417116,
slip op. at 2 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2011).
76 See United States v. Shafeek, CRIM. 05-81129, 2010 WL 3789747
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010). See infra note 98 (discussing the Shafeek
opinion).
n See United States v. Gilbert, 2:03-CR-00349-WJM-1, 2010 WL
4134286, slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2010);United States v. Hough,
2:02-CR-00649-WJM-1, 2010 WL 5250996, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Dec.
17, 2010).
78 See Ellis v. United States, 806 F.Supp.2d 538, 550 (E.D.N.Y. June 3,
2011).
7 See United States v. Agoro, CR 90-102 ML, 2011 WL 6029888, slip
op. at 7 (D.R.I. Nov. 16, 2011).
80 See Dennis v. United States, 787 F.Supp. 2d 425, 430 (D.S.C. 2011).
8' See Doan v. United States, 760 F.Supp. 2d 602, 605 (E.D. Va. 2011);
Mendoza v. United States, 774 F.Supp. 2d 791, 798 (E.D. Va. 2011).
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82 83 8485in Arizona, Florida, Maryland,84  Michigan, New
86 8
York, and North Carolina.
Among courts that discussed Padilla's retroactivity,
both the quality and quantity of analysis varies greatly. For
example, some courts have summarily stated that Padilla
does not apply retroactively, without stating a basis for that
conclusion." Additionally, many courts have noted the
issue, but decided the case without reaching it. For
example, many courts considering a collateral attack on a
guilty plea under Padilla, have found that, even assuming
Padilla applies retroactively, the petitioner could not
surmount Strickland's "high bar"89 to show ineffective
assistance of counsel. 90
82 See State v. Poblete, 260 P.3d 1102, 1106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
83 See Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So.3d 868, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011); Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011); Smith v. State, 85 So.3d 551, 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012);
State v. Shaikh, 65 So.3d 539, 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
84 See Miller v. State, 196 Md. App. 658, 677 (2010).
85 See People v. Gomez, 295 Mich.App. 411, 411 (2012).
86 See People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, slip op. at 4 (Crim. Ct.
2010); see also infra note 159 (discussing Kabre).
87 See State v. Alshaif, 724 S.E.2d 597, 604 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
88 For example, one court simply stated that "the 2010 Padilla decision
does not apply retroactively[,]" without providing any basis for that
conclusion. United States v. Cervantes-Martinez 10CR4776 JM, 2011
WL 4434861, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011).
89 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (noting that
"[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task").
90 See, e.g., Masterman v. United States, 1:96-CR-05306-OWW, 2010
WL 4366156, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) (finding that even
"[a]ssuming arguendo that Padilla applies retroactively and thus that
Petitioner's claim is timely under section 2255(f)(3), Petitioner's claim
lacks merit") (emphasis in original); Trujillo v. State, 71AO3-l102-PC-
73, 2011 WL 5909637, slip op. at 6 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2011)
("assum[ing] for the sake of argument, but explicitly []not decid[ing],
that the case announcing th[e] rule, i.e., Padilla v. Kentucky, applies
retroactively to the instant case[, the court determined that it] need not
address these matters because [it could] resolve this issue on grounds of
lack of a showing of prejudice") (citation omitted).
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A number of courts have also considered whether
Padilla applies retroactively to federal habeas corpus
petitions. To find that Padilla applies retroactively in this
context, courts would be required to make the potentially
contradictory determinations that Padilla is "newly
recognized" under federal habeas corpus law92 but not a
"new rule" under Teague.9 3 Put differently, these courts are
not giving consideration to whether Padilla is the
application of an "old rule" for Teague purposes. 94
Unsurprisingly, courts that have assumed that
Padilla is "new" for Teague purposes have determined that
Padilla does not apply retroactively 95 to cases on collateral
91 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008).
92 See id. at § 2255(f)(3) (extending the 1-year statute of limitations in
federal habeas corpus petitions when "the date on which the right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review") (emphasis added).
See United States v. Estrada-Perez, CRIM. 02-403(3) DSD, 2011 WL
2965249, slip op. at n.l (D. Minn. July 22, 2011) (stating that "[i]f
Padilla did not announce a new rule, then it would be illogical to find a
right 'newly recognized' in March 2010[, when Padilla was decided]");
Asif v. Comm'r of Correction, 32 A.3d 967, 969 (2011) (stating "we
find somewhat inconsistent the petitioner's argument that Padilla
represents a new fact but does not set forth a new rule").
94 Often, these courts will say "assuming arguendo" or "assuming for
Petitioner's benefit" that Padilla is new, it does not apply retroactively.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 1:10-CV-23718-WKW, 2011 WL
3419614, slip op. at 6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2011) ("Assuming for Ms.
Rodriguez's benefit that the Padilla decision in fact announced a 'new
rule,' Ms. Rodriguez must show that the right announced in Padilla
was made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review[.]")
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
95 As noted previously, the term "retroactivity" is a misnomer. See
supra, p. 10. Its definition becomes even more abstruse when courts are
applying a specific case to federal habeas petitions. Courts are, in
effect, considering retroactivity under two separate and distinct areas of
the law-federal statutory law governing habeas petitions and the
"constitutional rule" case law under Teague and its progeny.
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review.96 In other words, these courts-regardless of
whether they explicitly say so-are not analyzing whether
Padilla applies retroactively under Supreme Court
precedent, but, rather, whether Padilla's holding is
retroactive under a specific statutory provision. 97 In certain
instances, the language of a court's opinion makes it
unclear whether they are considering Padilla's potential
retroactivity under Supreme Court precedent or federal
law. 98
96 Under Teague, there are two narrow instances where a new rule of
constitutional criminal procedure can apply retroactively. See supra
note 43 (discussing the circumstances by which a "new" rule of
constitutional criminal procedure can apply retroactively). Cf
Mudahinyuka v. United States, 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, slip op.
at 4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) ("This court is not aware of any decision by
a state or federal court holding that the Supreme Court recognized a
new right in Padilla that is also retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review.") and Haddad v. United States, CIV. 07-12540, 2010
WL 2884645, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2010) (assuming that
Padilla is a new rule, and finding that "it is unlikely that Padilla will be
made retroactive to convictions under collateral attack") with
Masterman v. United States, 1:96-CR-05306-OWW, 2010 WL
4366156, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) (citing authority for the
court's proposition that "Padilla applies retroactively [under]
2255(f)(3)," but ultimately finding that Padilla was not retroactive to
the instant case because Strickland's high bar could not be
surmounted).
97 It Still may be possible that Padilla is a "newly recognized" rule
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), but not a "new rule" under Teague. In
that case, it would apply retroactively to habeas corpus petitions.
However, no court has yet reached this conclusion explicitly. Cf
Carrasco v. United States, EP-ll-CV-161-DB, 2011 WL 1743318, slip
op. at 3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2011) (assuming that Padilla applies
retroactively and still considering a 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) motion, but
ultimately concluding that the motion was untimely).
98 For example, in United States v. Shafeek, it is unclear whether the
court it is determining Padilla's potential retroactivity under Supreme
Court precedent (e.g. Teague) or habeas corpus law. CRIM. 05-81129,
2010 WL 3789747 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010). To be sure, the
petitioner in that case is proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the
court is specifically considering "whether the Padilla decision was
21
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The above information shows that state courts are
more likely than federal courts to determine that Padilla
applies retroactively. The fact that federal courts are less
likely to find that Padilla applies retroactively is
unsurprising, considering that federal habeas law has a
strict statute of limitations. 99 By contrast, state courts are
able to conduct their own retroactivity analysis under their
state constitution; 00 moreover, there are a number of
reasons why a state court would prefer to resolve the
retroactivity issue under its state constitution.' 01
meant to be applied retroactively" under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Id. at
2. Still, however, the court's retroactivity analysis mentions only how
to apply Teague. Id. The court's ultimate conclusion is that "[b]ecause
the Padilla opinion may not be considered a 'new rule,' Shafeek cannot
show that the Padilla opinion should be applied retroactively." Id. at 3.
The court's conclusion, to the extent that it says that opinions that are
not "new rules" cannot be applied retroactively, gets a crucial portion
of Teague backwards. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (holding that "new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure will not be [retroactive] to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced") (emphasis added). But cf
United States v. Bacchus, CR 93-083S, 2010 WL 5571730, slip op. at I
(D.R.I. Dec. 8, 2010) (calling the Shafeek opinion, "a well-reasoned
decision, [which] concluded that the Supreme Court did not announce a
'new rule' in Padilla and that retroactive application was not warranted
under Teague v. Lane").
99 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (one-year statute of limitations).
10 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 289 (2008) ("States that
give broader retroactive effect to this Court's new rules of criminal
procedure do not do so by misconstruing the federal Teague standard.
Rather, they have developed state law to govern retroactivity in state
postconviction proceedings.") (emphasis in original).
o'0 For example: 1) if the issue of retroactivity is being raised pursuant
to a state case (see e.g. State v. Gaitan, 206 N.J. 330 (2011) (accepting
certiorari from State v. Gaitan, 419 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 2011) to
decide whether State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129 (2009), applies
retroactively)); 2) a state may have its own-possibly more favorable-
case law regarding the retroactivity of constitutional rules of criminal
procedures (see e.g. State v. Bonilla, 957 N.E.2d 682, 682 n.2 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011) ("We need not address the retroactive application of
Padilla, as its holding was consistent with Indiana decisions that
22
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Because cases on this issue are coming out so
quickly, and because of the confusion over how to apply
Teague, it is difficult to determine whether retroactive
application is the majority position. Consequently, courts
that have determined what the majority position is, have,
unsurprisingly, found that their position is that of the
majority.o Although the total number of courts that favor
retroactivity is important, the opinions of appellate courts
carry more weight because they create binding precedent in
a larger number of jurisdictions.
B. Circuit Court and State Supreme Court
Opinions
1. Third Circuit
In United States v. Orocio,103 the Third Circuit,
applying Teague, held that Padilla applied retroactively to
cases on collateral review. The Third Circuit was the first
circuit to address the issue. 104 Like every other court that
predated Padilla[J")); and 3) precedent (such as an unfavorable
appellate decision) may preclude a state court from finding retroactivity
under federal law.
102 Cf Marroquin v. United States, CIV.A. M-10-156, 2011 WL
488985, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2011) (finding that "a majority
of courts have found that Padilla is simply the application of an old
rule, concluding that Padilla' s holding applies retroactively") with
United States v. Abraham, 8:09CR126, 2011 WL 3882290, slip op. at 2
(D. Neb. Sept. 1, 2011) ("The weight of authority appears to favor
nonretroactivity."); see also United States v. Agoro. CR 90-102 ML,
2011 WL 6029888, slip op. at 6 (D.R.I. Nov. 16, 2011) (noting the
disagreement over what the majority position is).
103 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011).
'0 Orocio was decided on June 29, 2011. Id. The Seventh, Tenth, and
Fifth Circuit opinions were decided on Aug. 23, 2011; August 30,
2011; and May 9, 2012, respectively. Chaidez v. United States, 655
F.3d 684, 684 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chang Hong, 10-6294,
2011 WL 3805763 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011); United States v. Amer
681 F.3d 211, 211 (2012).
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has reached the conclusion that Padilla applies
retroactively, the Orocio court found that Padilla was not a
"new rule" under Teague. 05
The Third Circuit's analysis was more
comprehensive than that of the Seventh, Tenth, and Fifth
Circuits-including considering the proper scope of Wright
v. West,'0 6 Strickland v. Washington,107 and Hill v.
los Orocio, 645 F.3d at 641 ("We therefore hold that, because Padilla
followed directly from Strickland and long-established professional
norms, it is an 'old rule' for Teague purposes and is retroactively
applicable on collateral review."); see also Mudahinyuka v. United
States, 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7,
2011) ("This court is not aware of any decision by a state or federal
court holding that the Supreme Court recognized a new right in Padilla
that is also retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.")
10 See Orocio, 645 F.3d at 640-641 (interpreting Wright v. West for the
proposition that "a court's disposition of each individual factual
scenario arising under the long-established Strickland standard is not in
each instance a 'new rule,' but rather a new application of an 'old rule'
in a manner dictated by precedent" (citing 505 U.S. 277, 308-309
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring))). Notably, the Chaidez court also
quotes the same language from Wright and draws the same conclusion
that the Third Circuit does from that case, namely "that the application
of Strickland to unique facts generally will not produce a new rule."
Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 692 (7th Cir. 2011). The
Chang Hong and Amer courts do not mention Wright v. West. United
States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763 (10th Cir.
Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1, 2011); United States v. Amer,
681 F.3d 211, 211 (2012).
107 See Orocio, 645 F.3d at 639 ("[T]he Strickland Court identified
certain basic duties that criminal defense attorneys must carry out to
perform competently within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment,
including a duty to consult with the defendant on important decisions.
When the Supreme Court decides a Strickland case with novel facts, we
do not place emphasis on the particular duty identified by the Supreme
Court as a basis for classifying the rule as 'new' for Teague purposes.
We look instead to precedents and then-existing professional norms to
determine whether the decision broke new ground.") (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). While the Seventh, Tenth, and Fifth
Circuits acknowledge that "Padilla is a Strickland case[,]" those courts
ultimately conclude that other factors lead it to conclude that Padilla is
24
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Lockhart.08 However, the Third Circuit omitted any
language from Teague which explains why cases decided
on collateral review must apply "retroactively" to other
cases similarly decided on collateral review. The fact that
the Orocio court was able to reach the conclusion that
Padilla applies retroactively without considering the
Supreme Court's self-proscription from issuing
constitutional "advisory opinions," 09 which weighs greatly
in favor of retroactivity, shows the logical strength of the
position that Padilla applies retroactively.
a "new rule." Chang Hong, 10-6294, slip op. at 5; Chaidez, 655 F.3d at
687; Amer, 681 F.3d at 214 (2012).
08 The Third Circuit considered Hill in a number of different contexts.
See Orocio, 645 F.3d at 639 ("Padilla is set within the confines of
Strickland and Hill, as it concerns what advice an attorney must give to
a criminal defendant at the plea stage."); see also id., at 638 (finding
that the argument that Padilla is new is undercut by Hill's language
that Strickland claims are governed by the "range of competence
demanded from attorneys" (citing Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 56
(1985))) (internal citations omitted). The Third Circuit also
convincingly argues that the Padilla's court "floodgates" discussion,
which compares Hill with Padilla, assumes retroactive application of
the Court's opinion in Padilla: "'[w]e confronted a similar 'floodgates'
concern in Hill, but nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that
counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his parole eligibility
before he pleaded guilty.... A flood did not follow in that decision's
wake."' Id. at 644 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484-
1485 (2010). By contrast, the Seventh Circuit did not mention Hill v.
Lockart in the context of the Court's "floodgates" argument in Padilla,
although it did mention that Hill provides a similar basis for analyzing
Strickland claims. Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d at 691 (citing
Hill, 474 U.S. at 56)). Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit found that, "[In
Padilla, t]he majority's characterization of Hill, suggests that it did not
understand the rule set forth in Padilla to be dictated by precedent."
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 689-690. The Amer court also interprets the
Padilla Court's discussion of Hill as evidence that Padilla does not
apply retroactively. Amer, 681 F.3d at 214; see also infra p. 20
(discussing the Amer court's characterization of Hill). The Chang Hong
court does not mention Hill v. Lockart. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294.
'0 Teague v. Lane, 489 US 288, 316 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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2. Seventh Circuit
In Chaidez v. United States," 0 the Seventh Circuit
held that Padilla did not apply retroactively. The Seventh
Circuit offered a number of factors disfavoring retroactive
application of Padilla. For example, the court found that
"[f]ack of unanimity on the [Supreme] Court in deciding a
particular case[, and in lower court's prior determinations
of the issue,] support[] the conclusion that the case
announced a new rule.""' The Chaidez court also found
that "to the extent that [it was able to] discern whether
members of the Court understood Padilla to be a new rule,
[]the clearest indications [were found] in the concurrence
and dissent, which [left the court with] no doubt that at
least four Justices view Padilla as new."112
Along with the Third Circuit, 113 the Seventh Circuit
correctly noted that the general rule is that a case applying
Strickland to a new set of facts does not create a new rule
for Teague purposes.1 4 En route to finding that Padilla was
a "rare exception"" 5 to this rule, the Seventh Circuit placed
undue weight on the disagreement between the Supreme
Court and lower courts,ll6 and among the Justices
"10 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) cert. granted 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
". Id. at 689.
112 Id. at 694.
11 United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting
that "it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it
forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent") (internal citations
omitted).
114 Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 692 ("recogniz[ing] that the application of
Strickland to unique facts generally will not produce a new rule" (citing
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring
in relevant part))).
1" Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693.
116 Id. at 692. (stating that the court was "persuaded by the weight of
lower court authority").
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themselves. 117 Disagreement, as the dissent in Chaidez
noted, "does not alter the fact that prevailing professional
norms at the time of [a petitioner's] plea required a lawyer
to advise her client of the immigration consequences of a
guilty plea... [and, t]he concurring and dissenting opinions
do not alter the straightforward application of Strickland[,]"
in Padilla.'8
In giving too much weight to inferences from the
concurrence and dissent, the Seventh Circuit ignored the
intent of the majority in Padilla. While the Chaidez court
acknowledged "indirect language" that supports the
position that the Supreme Court meant Padilla to apply
retroactively, it fails to identify that language or give it any
weight in its determination of whether Padilla applies
retroactively. 119 In short, the Seventh Circuit relied too
heavily on its own inferences from the concurrence and
dissenting opinions and the split among the lower courts.
The Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Chaidez
to decide if Padilla applies retroactively.12 0
3. Tenth Circuit
In United States v. Chang Hong,121 the Tenth
Circuit held that Padilla does not apply retroactively.
Among courts that have reached the retroactivity question
in the negative, the Chang Hong court is one of the most
ambitious in its analysis of whether Padilla qualifies as a
.17 Id. at 689 (finding that "[1]ack of unanimity on the [Supreme] Court
in deciding a particular case supports the conclusion that the case
announced a new rule").
"' Id. at 696-697 (dissent).
"9 Id. at 693.
120 Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
121 United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763
(10th Cir., Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1, 2011).
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"new rule" under Teague. 122 The basis for its conclusion
that Padilla created a new rule is that "Padilla extended the
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel and applied it
to an aspect of a plea bargain previously untouched by
Strickland."l23 Under Teague, the holding of a case will not
be deemed to have created a new rule-and it will,
therefore, be retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review-if it applies an old rule to a new set of facts.124
Therefore, the fact that the holding of a case reaches into an
area "previously untouched" is not helpful for determining
whether it is an application of an old rule to a new set of
facts. By the Chang Hong court's reasoning, it would be
difficult to imagine a holding that merely applied an old
rule to a new set of facts.
The Chang Hong court also addressed the important
language in Padilla that implies retroactive applicationl25
"[Petitioner] argues there would be no need to discuss pleas
'already obtained' if the case did not apply
retroactively."' 26 In rejecting this argument the Chang
Hong court said that it "interpret[ed] the Court's statement
to simply recognize that past decisions enumerating the
contours of Strickland have not led to a surfeit of collateral
attacks on guilty pleas. The force of the Court's argument is
that Padilla would have a similar (lack of) effect on guilty
pleas." 27 The Chang Hong court, in other words, said that
122 Cf id. at 8 (stating that "Padilla is a new rule of constitutional law
not because of what it applies-Strickland-but because of where it
applies-collateral immigration consequences of a plea bargain") with
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693 (calling it a "rare exception" when a
Strickland case produces a new rule).
123 Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, slip op. at 8.
124 See Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 688 ("Under Teague, a constitutional rule
of criminal procedure applies to all cases on direct and collateral review
if it is not a new rule, but rather an old rule applied to new facts.").
125 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).
126 Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, slip op. at 9-10 (citing Padilla, 130 S.
Ct. at 1485).
127 Id. at 10.
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the Supreme Court's use of the past tense, "already
obtained," referred to "past decisions". However, the
Supreme Court plainly used the phrase "convictions already
obtained," not referring to past decisions.'28
Perhaps recognizing that their interpretation of the
Court's language in Padilla is unpersuasive, the Chang
Hong court also stated that "it [would be] unwise to imply
retroactivity based on dicta."l 29 However, the Chang Hong
court itself relies on the dicta of the concurring and
dissenting opinions.130 Adding to its seemingly uneven
analysis, the Tenth Circuit also failed to cite any language
from Teague, or Teague's progeny, that might indicate that
Padilla should be applied retroactively.
4. Fifth Circuit
In May 2012, the Fifth Circuit became the fourth,
and likely final, circuit to weigh in on Padilla's
retroactivity when it decided United States v. Amer.131 The
court noted at the outset that the "issue presently is pending
before the Supreme Court." 3 2 The court ultimately agreed
with the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, that Padilla was
"new" within the meaning of Teague.133 The Amer court
found that the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla was not
"dictated by precedent." 34 In making this determination
the Amer court fashioned its own test which includes three
factors:
128 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (emphasis added).
129 Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, slip op. at 10.
130 Id. at 6 ("We take the concurrence and dissent as support for our
conclusion that reasonable jurists did not find the rule in Padilla
compelled or dictated by the Court's prior precedent.")
131 681 F.3d 211 (2012).
132 Id. (citing Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
133 Amer, 681 F.3d at 211.
134 Id. (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion)).
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1) whether the decision announcing the rule at issue
purported to rely on "controlling precedent," 35
2) whether there was a "difference of opinion on the
part of ... lower courts that had considered the
question,"' 36 and
3) whether the Justices expressed an "array of
views.
The court found that the Padilla Court did not
"purport[] to" rely on controlling precedent because the
Padilla Court stated in a footnote that, "the Hill [v.
Lockart] Court did not resolve the particular question
respecting misadvice that was before it."1 38 However, the
Supreme Court immediately followed that statement with
the statement that, "[Hill's] import is nevertheless clear[,
and w]hether Strickland applies to Padilla's claim follows
from Hill, regardless of the fact that the Hill Court did not
resolve the particular question respecting misadvice that
was before it."' 39 Padilla builds upon the precedents of Hill
and Strickland. The Padilla Court's reliance on these prior
cases is deep and unambiguous.
With regard to the difference of opinion among
lower courts, the Fifth Circuit makes the same error of
circular logic that the Seventh and Tenth Circuits make.
The Amer court found that "the near-universal position of
the lower state and federal courts," that failure to advise a
non-citizen that deportation will result from a guilty plea
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,
evinces that Padilla should not apply retroactively.140
1 Amer, 681 F.3d at 213 (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518,
528 (1997)).
136 Amer, 681 F.3d at 213 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415
(1990)).
137 Amer, 681 F.3d at 213 (citing O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151,
159 (1997)).
1 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 n. 12.
139 id.
140 Amer, 681 F.3d at 214.
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Relying on these lower courts' holdings, however, ignores
the fact that the basis of these opinions was the direct-
collateral consequences distinction, which was explicitly
repudiated in Padilla.141
Finally, the Fifth Circuit argues that Padilla is not
retroactive because the concurrence and dissent represent
an "array of views," which shows that Padilla announced a
new rule. Like the Seventh and Tenth Circuits before it, the
Fifth Circuit gives undue weight to the dicta of a
concurring and dissenting opinions. The Amer court's
reliance on the concurring and dissenting opinions presents
a stark contrast with its unwillingness to consider any
reason why Padilla might apply retroactively.
The court states in a footnote that it will not
consider the Padilla majority's suggestion that Padilla
should apply retroactively-or any other reason why
Padilla apply retroactively-because it does not want to
"perceive a dictate from an inference." 4 2 However, the
Amer court relies on its own inferences from the
concurrence and dissent. It is illogical to ignore the opinion
of the Court while defining the reach of a case through
inferences from minority opinions.
5. State Supreme Courts
The opinions of state supreme courts are of great
consequence, because, like circuit court opinions, they can
be overturned only by the Supreme Court. Additionally, the
vast majority of guilty pleas occur in state court
proceedings. 143 As a result, it can be argued that state law
141 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482, (2010) ("The collateral
versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland
claim concerning the specific risk of deportation.").
142 Amer, 681 F.3d at 214, n. 2.
143 In 2004, for example, more than five times as many guilty pleas
occurred in state courts than occurred in their federal counterparts. See
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of
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precedent has a greater practical impact than its federal
counterpart.
It has been noted that Padilla-in holding that
failure of counsel to advise a client about the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel-abrogated precedent in many state
and federal jurisdictions.144 Still, there are state supreme
courts that have applied Padilla retroactively, including the
highest courts in Maryland,145  Massachusetts 46  and
Michigan.147 The New Jersey Supreme Court, by contrast,
found that Nunez-Valdez, a case decided under New Jersey
law that is substantially similar to Padilla, did not apply
retroactively.148 As noted above, it is within the purview of
Criminal Justice Statistics Online, tbl.5.26.2004,
http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t5242004.pdf (showing that
70,591 guilty pleas were entered in District Courts in 2004) (last visited
July, 2012); Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, tbl.5.46.2004,
http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t5462004.pdf (showing that
available data documents 553,356 guilty pleas obtained in state courts
in 2004) (last visited July, 2012). The Department of Justice estimates
that their data only shows approximately half of the actual number of
convictions that occur in state courts. Id. Because we do not have data
available for these convictions we cannot know how many were the
result of guilty pleas or plea bargains. However, if these convictions
follow the trend, then it is possible that state courts handled more than
ten times as many guilty pleas as federal courts.
144 Cf Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1491 (2010) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (stating that "the majority does not cite a single case, from
this or any other federal court, holding that criminal defense counsel's
failure to provide advice concerning the removal consequences of a
criminal conviction violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel") with State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129 (2009) (finding
that, under the N.J. constitution, the right to effective assistance of
counsel applied to the immigration consequences of a plea).
145 See Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 923 (Md. 2011).
146 See Com. v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Mass. 2011).
147 See People v. Abbas, 794 N.W.2d 617, 617 (Mich. 2011).
148 State v. Gaitan, A-109 SEPT.TERM 2010, 2012 WL 612311, slip
op. at 20 (N.J. Feb. 28, 2012) (Padilla is not entitled to retroactive
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state courts to find that Padilla's central holding is
retroactive under their own case law.' 4 9
Many state supreme courts have made statements
concerning Padilla's retroactivity without deciding the
issue. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court has
addressed Padilla's retroactivity only briefly-in the
footnote of an unpublished opinion.150 The Delaware
Supreme Court found that "United States Supreme Court
and Delaware Supreme Court precedents suggest that the
rule in Padilla may not retroactively apply."' ' Similarly,
the Georgia' 5 2 and Maine' 53 Supreme Courts chose not to
address the issue. More important than the result of any one
court is the quality of the analysis that supports that court's
conclusion.
C. Evaluation of Common Arguments For
Applying Padilla Retroactively
1. The Padilla Decision Itself Would Have
Been Precluded By a Retroactivity Bar
Jose Padilla's guilty plea, from 2002, was itself on
application, [and, therefore,] we find no attorney violation
of Padilla's requirements in this matter. As for Nuiiez-Valdit, we find
in this record no deficiency like what occurred in that matter[.]")
149 See State v. Bonilla, 957 N.E.2d 682, 682 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(finding that the court "need not address the retroactive application of
Padilla, as its holding was consistent with Indiana decisions that
predated Padilla"); see also supra note 101 (explaining when a state
may wish to find the rule of Padilla retroactive under its own case law).
Iso Ruiz v. State, 23 A.3d 866, slip op. at 3 n.19 (Del. July 6, 2011)
(unpublished).
15' Id.
152 See Smith v. State, 287 Ga. 391, 404 (2010).
153 See State v. Ali, 32 A.3d 1019, 1023 (Me. 2011).
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collateral review;' 54 research for this article uncovered only
one published case 155 to attribute proper significance to that
fact. This fact is significant in understanding what
"retroactivity" truly means for Padilla. Without a doubt, all
of those bringing Padilla claims based on convictions that
occurred after 2002 are in every way "similarly situated" to
Jose Padilla.' 57 Therefore, it is nonsensical to apply Padilla
only prospectively, when that same retroactivity bar would
have precluded the result in Padilla itself. 5 8 Another way
of putting this, is that Padilla announced a rule on
collateral review, and that when a rule is announced on
collateral review, it must apply retroactively to "avoid the[]
154 "Final judgment was entered October 4, 2002." Com. v. Padilla, 253
S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008) rev'd and remanded sub nom. Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
1ss See Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL
3793691, 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011). The Santos-Sanchez court found
that, because Padilla was itself decided on collateral review, "[i]t is
incontrovertible that if Padilla is analyzed under Teague, it must be
applied retroactively to [other] cases on collateral review." Id.
156 For example, the Third Circuit opinion, holding that Padilla does
apply retroactively, contains a section on "Teague and retroactivity,"
but does not mention that Teague's statement that the Supreme Court
will apply all decisions on collateral review retroactively in fairness to
those "similarly situated". U.S. v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 637 (3d Cir.
2011); see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
1 In other words, convictions that occurred before 2012, like Jose
Padilla's 2002 conviction, occurred before the Court's decision in
Padilla.
158 Consider the case of People v. Kabre. 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, slip op. at
4 (Crim. Ct. 2010). The Kabre court held that, "Petitioner can prevail
here only if a New York court in 2005 (when the last conviction at
issue here became final) would have been required by controlling
United States Supreme Court precedent to rule that failure to discuss
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea was ineffective
assistance of counsel." Id. The Kabre court does not explain why it is
appropriate to apply the rule announced in Padilla retroactively to a
conviction that occurred in 2002, but not apply that same rule in Kabre,
when Kabre's conviction occurred in 2005.
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problems of rendering advisory constitutional opinions and
creating inequities resulting from the uneven application of
constitutional rules."159
2. A Teague Analysis Necessarily Results in
Retroactive Application of Padilla
Under a Teague analysis, a rule of constitutional
criminal procedure always applies retroactively. The
plurality in Teague said that the Supreme Court will
"simply refuse to announce a new rule in a case unless the
rule would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the
case and to all others similarly situated."160 Teague's
statement is that the law will not allow the application of
"retroactivity" principles to result in an uneven application
of constitutional rules. Thus, the Supreme Court will apply
all decisions on collateral review retroactively in fairness to
those "similarly situated."' 6 1 By itself, this is dispositive on
the issue of whether Padilla should apply retroactively.' 62
In short, courts analyzing Padilla under Teague
should always reach the conclusion that Padilla applies
retroactively.163 In other words, "Teague establishes that
159 People v. De Jesus, 30 Misc. 3d 1203(A), slip op. at 10 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2010) (unpublished disposition).
'6 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (emphasis added).
161 Id. See Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity,
or "Redressability," After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts
Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal
Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 71
(2009) (concluding that "full retroactivity...serves the goals of
according fairness to similarly situated litigants").
162 We must remember that our analysis here is whether the Supreme
Court intended for Padilla to be retroactive. Because the Supreme
Court does not create new constitutional rules unless they will apply
retroactively to all those similarly situated, Padilla should apply
retroactively.
163 That does not mean that a Teague analysis is never called for. See
supra p. 13 (showing how the Teague analysis of "new rules" affects
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where the Court does announce a 'new' rule of
constitutional criminal procedure in the exercise of its
collateral review powers, it will be doing so because the
new rule fits within one of the two Teague exceptions, and,
therefore, applies retroactively to all similarly situated
cases."1 64 Therefore, even in the unlikely event Supreme
Court intended for Padilla to be considered a "new rule,"
one of the Teague exceptions necessarily applies, and the
rule applies retroactively.
3. The Supreme Court Has Already Applied
Padilla Retroactively
Less than a week after Padilla came down, the
Supreme Court "remanded [a case back] to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further
consideration in light of Padilla[.]"1 6 5 The Supreme Court's
remand undercuts the argument that Padilla should apply
only prospectively. When the Supreme Court decided
Padilla, it announced the rule that non-citizens who are
deported as a result of the ineffective assistance of counsel
can challenge their underlying conviction. Also, in addition
to announcing the rule of Padilla, the Padilla Court also
applied the rule of Padilla to Jose Padilla's 2002
the analysis of "newly recognized" rights under federal habeas law).
Moreover, it has been noted that "Teague does a poor job" of helping
courts decide whether the rule of a case should apply retroactively.
Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL 3793691, slip
op. at 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011).
164 People v. De Jesus, 30 Misc. 3d 1203(A), slip op. at 10-11 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2010) (unreported disposition).
165 Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2340, 2340 (2010).
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conviction.166 This was the first instance of the Supreme
Court applying the rule of Padilla retroactively.167
Less than a week later, the Supreme Court applied
Padilla retroactively for a second time, to Jesus Santos-
Sanchez's 2003 conviction.168 In other words, the Supreme
Court has itself applied Padilla retroactively on two
separate occasions: once to Jose Padilla's 2002 conviction,
and then again to Jesus Santos-Sanchez's 2003 conviction.
Only a few courts have noted the significance of this
fact.169 Considering that one of the goals of the Supreme
Court's retroactivity jurisprudence is to "avoid[] the
inequity resulting from the uneven application" of the
law,170 courts that refuse to apply Padilla to convictions
that occurred prior to the decision in Padilla do so in direct
conflict with the Supreme Court.
166 "Final judgment was entered October 4, 2002." Com. v. Padilla, 253
S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008) rev'd and remanded sub nom. Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
167 Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL 3793691, slip op.
at 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011) (finding that "the Supreme Court's
holding (rule) was applied to Padilla ") (emphasis in original).
168 Santos-Sanchez, 130 S. Ct. at 2340; see also Santos-Sanchez v.
United States, 548 F.3d 327, 329 (5th Cir. 2008) ("[In September,
2003,] Santos-Sanchez appeared before a magistrate judge and pleaded
guilty.") cert. granted and judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. at 2340 (2010).
169 Research for this article uncovered only one published opinion that
explicitly stated that the Supreme Court's remand of Santos-Sanchez
was evidence that Padilla should apply retroactively. Com. v. Clarke,
949 N.E.2d 892, 904 (Mass. 2011) ("A few days after its decision in
Padilla, the Supreme Court remanded [Santos-Sanchez, id.,] for further
consideration in light of Padilla. That case, too, was on collateral
review and the conviction had become final before the Court's decision
in Padilla.") (citation omitted).
170 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (plurality opinion).
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D. Evaluation of Common Arguments Against
Applying Retroactively
1. The Language of the Concurrences and
Dissenting Justices Makes Clear that They
Think Padilla is New.
All three circuits that held that Padilla did not apply
retroactively relied, at least in part, on the fact that the
decision in Padilla '7 was not unanimous. 172 This argument
gives undue weight to the concurring and dissenting
justices, and more broadly, to the existence of dissenting
opinions as evidence that a decision should not apply
retroactively. Moreover, this argument ignores the
majority's clear intention to apply Padilla retroactively.
Implicit throughout the majority's opinion in
Padilla is that it will apply retroactively. For example, the
Padilla Court stated that it was unlikely that Padilla would
"have a significant effect on those convictions already
obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at least the past
17 In Padilla, Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, in which Chief
Justice Roberts joined, stating that he would have limited the holding of
Padilla to finding that a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel
required "affirmative misadvice." Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1492 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring); Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, in which he argued that the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel did not cover the "collateral
consequences" of a plea bargain. Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172 See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2011)
("The majority opinion in Padilla drew a concurrence authored by
Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as a
dissenting opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice
Thomas. That the members of the Padilla Court expressed such an
'array of views' indicates that Padilla was not dictated by precedent.");
see also United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL
3805763, slip op. at 6 (10th Cir., Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1,
2011) ("We take the concurrence and dissent as support for our
conclusion that reasonable jurists did not find the rule
in Padilla compelled or dictated by the Court's prior precedent.").
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15 years, professional norms have generally imposed an
obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation
consequences of a client's plea."173 Generally, those who
argue that Padilla should be applied retroactively have
noted that the Court's language implies retroactive
application.174 Similarly, courts that found Padilla to apply
retroactively have cited that same language. 175
The main tool in determining whether Padilla
applies retroactively is Supreme Court precedent.
Therefore, it is beyond dispute that the Supreme Court has
the power to determine whether cases, including Padilla,
apply retroactively. Most courts that have considered
whether Padilla applies retroactively believed that the
majority's intent regarding retroactivity warranted
discussion. However, many courts that have held Padilla
is not retroactive have seemed to give more weight to the
concurring and dissenting justices. 7 At least some of these
courts seem to think that the mere existence of concurring
173 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (emphasis added).
174 Dan Kesselbrenner, A Defending Immigrants Partnership Practice
Advisory: Duty of Criminal Defense Counsel Representing an
Immigrant Defendant After Padilla v. Kentucky, National Immigration
Project, 3 (June 24, 2010), available at
http://nationalimmigrationproject.orgAegalresources/cd-pa-padilla-retr
oactivity.pdf (last visited July, 2012).
17 See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011).
176 See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL
3805763, slip op. at 10 (10th Cir., Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1,
2011) (holding that Padilla does not apply retroactively, but still
discussing whether the majority intended for Padilla to apply
retroactively).
177 While courts do not generally reveal how much weight they are
giving different considerations, some acknowledge that they find the
language of the concurrence and dissent more instructive. See Chaidez
v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that "to the
extent that [it was able to] discern whether members of the Court
understood Padilla to be a new rule, []the clearest indications [were
found] in the concurrence and dissent, which [left the court with] no
doubt that at least four Justices view Padilla as new").
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and dissenting opinions evinces that Padilla is a new
rule.17 8 This ignores clear Supreme Court precedent "that
the mere existence of a dissent [fails] to show that the rule
is new."1 79
Courts holding that Padilla did not apply
retroactively gave too much weight to their own inferences
from the concurring and dissenting opinions, while
ignoring the clear intent of the majority, which was to
apply Padilla retroactively. For example, as the Chaidez
court notes, the dissenting justices-and, to some extent,
the concurring justices-clearly view Padilla as "new." 80
But, it is axiomatic that justices who disagree with a
decision would regard that decision as new; otherwise, a
dissenting justice would be required to argue that the result
reached by the majority was dictated by precedent, but that
they disagree with that controlling precedent.
2. The Pre-Padilla Split Among the Lower
Federal Courts Evinces that the Padilla
Decision Announces a "New" Rule.
The argument that the pre-Padilla split among
lower federal courts demonstrates that Padilla is new
ignores the basis for the Supreme Court's holding in
Padilla. In holding that the direct-collateral consequences
distinction was inappropriate under Strickland, the Court
undermined the basis for the lower courts' holding; Padilla
did not create a new constitutional rule. In fact, in Padilla,
the Supreme Court noted that it had "never applied a
distinction between direct and collateral consequences to
'7 See id. at 694 (finding that the concurrence and dissent "leave no
doubt that at least four Justices view Padilla as new").
179 Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 n.5 (2004).
180 Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir. 2011).
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define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable
professional assistance' required under Strickland."'8'
Because the lower courts' decisions not to apply the
6th AmendmentlStrickland to immigration consequences of
a guilty plea were based on the erroneous direct-collateral
consequences distinction, courts' reliance on these earlier
opinions was misplaced.182 Even if we accept, arguendo,
that the pre-Padilla split among lower federal courts was
evidence that Padilla created a new rule, there is no
precedent which gives that split any significant weight.
Contrarily, for example, courts considering whether the
holding of Roe v. Flores-Ortegal83 applied retroactively
found that "[d]espite the existence of conflicting authority
prior to the Court's decision, and the relative specificity of
the rule that the Supreme Court laid out.. .Flores-Ortega
did not announce a new rule[,]" and therefore applied
retroactively.184
"[T]he mere existence of conflicting authority does
not necessarily mean a rule is new." In short, courts
should not place any significant weight on the pre-Padilla
split among lower federal courts in their retroactivity
analyses because there is no precedent to do so.
181 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
182 See Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 697 (7th Cir. 2011) (dissent); but see
United States v. Chang Hong, 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763d, slip op. at
7 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1, 2011) ("lower courts
had adhered to this direct versus collateral dichotomy. The departure
from that longstanding legal distinction, and the application of
Strickland to immigration consequences of a guilty plea, was an
extension of Strickland into previously untread [sic] grounds");
Chaidezs, 655 F.3d at 689 (finding that "lower courts were split on the
issue[, which is evidence that] the outcome of the case was susceptible
to reasonable debate . .. [, and] that Padilla announced a new rule").
183 Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476 (2000) (obligations of
counsel to inform their clients about their appellate rights).
184 Com. v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 901 (2011).
185 Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment)).
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3. Padilla is New Because Applying
"Collateral Consequences" of a Plea to the
6"' Amendment/Strickland Test Has Never
Been Done Before
When considering retroactivity under Teague, the
general rule is that application of an old rule to a new set of
facts will not create a new rule.186 However, some courts
have found that the Supreme Court's expansion of
Strickland into the area of "collateral consequences" of a
guilty plea, which had previously been "outside the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment," weighed against
applying Padilla retroactively. 187 By contrast, courts in the
past have considered other expansions of Strickland to new
factual situations to have not created a new rule for Teague
purposes. 1 Courts that have reached the conclusion that
186 Even the Chiadez court, which held that Padilla created a new rule,
acknowledged the general rule that ordinarily new applications of an
old rule does not create a new rule for Teague purposes. Chaidez, 655
F.3d at 692 (noting that "the application of Strickland to unique facts
generally will not produce a new rule" citing Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in relevant part)).
187 United States v. Chang Hong, 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763, slip op.
at 6 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011), as amended (Sept. 1, 2011); see also
Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 691 (finding that "prior to Padilla, the Court had
not foreclosed the possibility that advice regarding collateral
consequences of a guilty plea could be constitutionally required. But
neither had the Court required defense counsel to provide advice
regarding consequences collateral to the criminal prosecution at issue")
(internal citation omitted).
188 See Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding
that "[Williams] and Rompilla are not new law under Teague." (citing
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) and Rompilla v. Beard, 545
U.S. 374, (2005) (holding that there was an obligation of counsel to
conduct reasonable investigation to determine mitigating factors to
present at penalty phase of capital murder case))); Com. v. Clarke, 949
N.E.2d 892, 901 (2011) (finding that the Third, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits all found the Flores-Ortega expansion of Strickland not to be a
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Padilla does not apply retroactively have not cited an
example of a case that created a new rule under Strickland.
In determining whether the application of Strickland to a
new set of facts constituted a new rule for Teague purposes,
many courtsl89 cited Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Wright v. West: "[where, as with Strickland, you have] a
rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a
myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case
that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one
not dictated by precedent."' 90
The Seventh Circuit found that Padilla was a "rare
exception" to the rule that a case does not announce a new
rule if it is merely applying a new set of facts to an old rule
(Strickland).191 In so holding, the Chiadez court said that
Padilla's holding "requir[ing] a criminal defense attorney
to provide advice about matters not directly related to their
client's criminal prosecution.. .was sufficiently novel as to
qualify as a new rule."' 92 However, the Supreme Court had
"never applied a distinction between direct and collateral
consequences to define the scope of constitutionally
'reasonable professional assistance' required under
Strickland[.]" 9 3  Additionally, the Supreme Court
recognized, nearly a decade before Padilla, that "alien
defendants considering whether to enter into a plea
new rule, but that the Fifth Circuit assumed Flores-Ortega to be a new
rule without explanation (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,
476 (2000) (obligations of counsel to inform their clients about their
appellate rights)) (internal citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 692; United States v. Orocio, 645
F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011); Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135,
1144 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hubenig, 6:03-MJ-040, 2010
WL 2650625, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010).
190 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
'9' Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693.
192 id.
193 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (internal citations
omitted).
43
9.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 88
agreement are acutely aware of the immigration
consequences of their convictions."'
1 94
V. Proposal
Common sense and fundamental fairness dictate
that Padilla v. Kentucky be applied retroactively. If Padilla
is applied retroactively, the next question is should Padilla
apply retroactively to only some categories of petitioners.
For example, one court found that Padilla would apply to
"guilty pleas obtained after the enactment of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996[.]"'95 There is indirect support for this proposition
from Padilla: "[flor at least the past 15 years, professional
norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to
provide advice on the deportation consequences of a
client's plea."' 96 In other words, the Supreme Court's
backward-looking language, which supports applying
Padilla retroactively, can also be offered as support for
limiting Padilla to only those whose convictions which
occurred after, approximately, March, 1995.197
There are essentially three categories of Padilla
petitioners:
1) Those who pled guilty prior to March, 1995
2) Those who pled guilty after March, 1995, but before
the March, 2010 Padilla decision
3) Those who pled guilty after the March, 2010
Padilla decision
194 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (citing Magana-Pizano v.
INS, 200 F.3d 603, 612 (C.A.9 1999)).
195 Corn. v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 895. The Clarke court does not rule
out the possibility that Padilla applies to convictions obtained before
the mid-1990s.
196 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (emphasis
added).
19 It should also be noted that the Supreme Court says "at least 15
years." Id. (emphasis added).
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No one disputes that Padilla applies, prospectively,
to those in category 3). Similarly, for courts that have found
that Padilla applies retroactively, Padilla will apply to
pleas between 1995 and 2010. Therefore, the question,
which courts have generally not considered, is, if Padilla
does apply retroactively, does it apply to convictions that
occurred before 1995. For the same reasons that Padilla
applies to those that occurred after 1995-namely, that the
result is dictated by the Court's opinion in Teague, and
fundamental fairness-Padilla should apply to convictions
that occurred before 1995.
Firstly, if, as courts applying Padilla retroactively
have held, Padilla is merely an application of new facts to
an old rule, then Padilla will apply retroactively to all
cases. In other words, Padilla merely holds that
Strickland's test for effective assistance of counsel applies
to the deportation context. Courts are generally experienced
in handling Strickland claims.199 And, in doing so, courts
are cautious in avoiding "hindsight bias." 200 With this in
mind, the question becomes how can Padilla/Strickland
apply to a conviction that occurred when, perhaps,
"professional norms [did not]... impose[] an obligation on
counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences
19 See, e.g., Com. v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 903 (finding that Padilla "is
the definitive application of an established constitutional standard on a
case-by-case basis, incorporating evolving professional norms (on
which the standard relies) to new facts. It is not the creation of a new
constitutional rule").
199 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 ("There is no reason to doubt that
lower courts-now quite experienced with applying Strickland-can
effectively and efficiently use its framework to separate specious
claims from those with substantial merit.").
200 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) (finding that
"hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to 'counsel's perspective
at the time' investigative decisions are made, and by giving deference
to counsel's judgments" (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668,
689 (1984))).
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of a client's plea."20 1 The answer is that pre-1995 Padilla
claims will be limited.
Applying pre-1995 professional norms, Padilla
claims may be limited to affirmative misadvice; Justice
Alito's concurrence, highlighting his dispute with the
majority in Padilla, said "that a criminal defense attorney
who refrains from providing immigration advice does not
violate prevailing professional norms."202 In other words,
the main difference between the majority and concurring
Justices, in Padilla, is that the latter would have limited
Strickland violations, in the immigration context, to when a
lawyer gives his client affirmative misadvice.203 In this
context, the Court's statement that, "For at least the past 15
years, professional norms have generally imposed an
obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation
consequences of a client's plea," 204 exists as a justification
for faulting attorneys who are silent about their client's
inevitable deportation-as opposed to faulting only those
attorneys who give affirmative misadvice-and does not
exist to limit Padilla claims to those convictions that have
occurred in the past fifteen years. Therefore, the Court's
opinion should not be used to limit Padilla's reach to pleas
occurring within a certain timeframe.
Secondly, fundamental fairness dictates that Padilla
apply to anyone who can surmount Strickland's high bar.
However, courts considering whether Padilla applies
retroactively have not considered fundamental fairness-or
even a balancing approach.205 It is understandable that
201 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
202 Id. at 1488 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
203 Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v.
Kentucky: the Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-half
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 1480 (2011) ("Justice Alito and
Chief Justice Roberts concurred, but only as to misadvice.").
204 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
205 While courts have failed to consider fundamental fairness, there is
much scholarly literature devoted to considering how fairness affects
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courts do not take into equitable considerations in their
retroactivity analysis because nothing in Teague or its
progeny permits such considerations. But the merits of
Teague as a basis for determining retroactively is, at best,
questionable; at worst, the admittedly "confused and
confusing"206 case law governing the retroactive
application of constitutional rules creates an uneven, unfair
and unjust basis for determining whether a rule applies
retroactively.207
Consequently, as, perhaps, Padilla demonstrates,
fairness should play more of a factor in whether a newly-
recognized constitutional rule of criminal procedure applies
to a class of petitioners. In determining whether Padilla
applies retroactively, courts should follow the Supreme
Court's lead in Padilla, and refrain from "engaging within
the traditional frames of formalism [and] the institutional
concerns of courts[;]" 208 instead, courts should consider
fundamental fairness in their retroactivity analysis.
The Supreme Court does not create new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure. Therefore, non-
citizens who were not given appropriate advice regarding
the immigration consequences of their plea have
necessarily had their constitutional rights violated. As such,
the plight of non-citizens within the criminal justice system. See, e.g.,
Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v.
Kentucky: the Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-half
Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 1465 (2011) (concluding that
"[d]eportation... must comply with [the] constitutional requirements of
fundamental fairness and due process").
206 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008).
207 See Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 5:06-CV-153, 2011 WL
3793691, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2011) (finding that "Teague
does a poor job" of helping courts decide whether the rule of a case
should apply retroactively).
208 McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to "Integral": The Seismic
Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond
Deportation, 54 How. L.J. 795, 798 (2011).
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courts should find that Padilla applies retroactively to all
cases on collateral review, so that non-citizens who have
had their rights violated, and have been deported as a result,
have redress.
VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's "retroactivity" case law
dictates that Padilla v. Kentucky apply retroactively.
However, the courts that have considered whether Padilla
applies retroactively have reached mixed results. Courts
have generally failed to mention the Supreme Court's own
statement that, to avoid issuing constitutional advisory
opinions, it will not apply a rule to a case on collateral
review unless that rule applies to all others similarly
situated. Moreover, the Supreme Court itself applied
Padilla retroactively. Therefore, properly considering the
Supreme Court's "retroactivity" case law, Padilla should
apply retroactively.
Absent from the Supreme Court's retroactivity case
law is consideration of fundamental fairness. Fairness
requires that the rule of Padilla be applied retroactively to
any petitioner who can surmount Strickland's high bar to
show ineffective assistance of counsel. To bring successful
Padilla claims, petitioners must show that they received
ineffective assistance of counsel, and that they were
deported as a result. Petitioners who can make such a
showing have necessarily suffered a constitutional
violation. The question then is whether they will have
redress. Fundamental fairness requires that Padilla apply
retroactively so that those who were deported as a result of
their constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel have
a remedy. In short, Padilla v. Kentucky should apply
209retroactively. -
209 Just weeks before this article was published, the Supreme Court of
the United States decided Chaidez v. United States. In a 7-2 decision,
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the Supreme Court decided that Padilla did not apply retroactively.
Both the Opinion of the Court and the dissent provide a comprehensive
"Teague" analysis. However, the Court did not distinguish Jose
Padilla's 2002 conviction and Roselva Chaidez's 2004 conviction. Nor
did the Court explain why the former warranted retroactive application
but the latter did not. In short, the Court's analysis ignored fairness and
common sense. Although Padilla's retroactivity is now settled, the
approach to retroactivity offered in this Article can be applied, by
analogy, to future retroactivity cases.
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